The right to peaceful assembly is recognized. Everyone has the right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions in order to protect his or her interests; The peace process continued in the context of repeated violations of the ceasefire provisions of the agreement. The parties supported the integration of other armed groups into existing military structures and the establishment of functional UOCs. The implementation of the formation of joint integrated units, which provide for a ceasefire, has been delayed by 18 months. This delay was also partly caused by the lack of logistical support.8 Similarly, the Political Ceasefire Commission proved unable to resolve important issues, such as UNMIS restrictions on freedom of movement north of the city of Abyei and the status of disputed resettlement areas.9 The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement provided that South Sudan would have the right to self-determination and, in this regard, the people of South Sudan would have the choice of: reaffirming unity or voting for secession. South Sudan`s right to self-determination has been enshrined in the Transitional Constitution (Article 219). Similarly, the APC has given Abyei residents the opportunity to vote separately and choose between retaining their special administrative status in the north or belonging to Bahr el Ghazal. This provision has also been incorporated into the Transitional Constitution (Article 183( 3)). The Constitution entered into force on 9 July 2005.1 With the secession of South Sudan on 9 July 2011, the territorial power-sharing provision of the agreement became obsolete.
The dispute over the demarcation of the border and who had the right to vote in the referendum in Abyei continued. As a result, a planned referendum in Abyei on its future status never took place.1 In fact, Sudan invaded and occupied Abyei in May 2011.2Jeffrey Gettleman and Josh Kron, “Warnings of All-Out War in Fight Over Sudan Town,” New York Times, May 22, 2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/05/23/world/africa/23sudan.html?pagewanted=a. Sudan and South Sudan had agreed to withdraw their troops from the disputed area by the end of September 2011. UN peacekeepers were stationed in the area to maintain peace as the disputed area became a focal point between north and south. In Abyei, the impasse over the Boundary Commission`s report continued. However, the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) has launched several confidence-building initiatives in response to migration issues, including a peace conference between the Dinka Ngok and Misseriya tribal groups.2 Progress has been made on police reform. In June 2007, the Council of Ministers adopted the National Police Law, which would reaffirm the provision of the CPA and the INC, which created three levels of police: national, southern and state. UndP, with support from the Multi-Donor Trust Fund, has begun training police and prison staff.1 The UN Police Corps continues to advise the SSPS on strategic developments, including governance and communication structures.
Un police officers were in six of the 10 southern states. The first group of 29 officers graduated in 2007. UNMIS has also received requests for assistance from five northern States for police training.2 No progress has been made in the deployment of joint integrated police units. In June 2007, Riek Machar, the main mediator of the Uganda-LRA talks, and south Sudan`s vice president gave the LRA three weeks to meet at the meeting place in South Sudan.1 However, it was unclear whether the LRA rebels had assembled or left South Sudan in 2007. The guiding principle of the Sudan Wealth Sharing Agreement was based on the premise that all regions of the Sudan have the right to development. Similarly, the parties recognized the need to build and rebuild South Sudan in order to achieve the same level of socio-economic and public service standards as the Northern State. The need to distribute wealth income and the establishment of two special funds were considered to strengthen local institutions and their human and economic capacities. Nevertheless, the agreement was more specific in terms of wealth redistribution than in terms of economic and social development. The agreement did not specify economic and social programmes as part of economic and social reforms. A group of parliamentarians from South Sudan visited Rwanda in early May to learn more about the country`s process of unity and reconciliation.1 Speaking at all Sudanese political party conferences in Juba, the First Vice-President stressed the need for a genuine process of reconciliation, healing, Of forgiveness and confidence-building.2 The lack of a reconciliation process was one of the factors that made Sudan`s unity less attractive to South Sudan.3 4.1 The lack of a reconciliation process was one of the factors that made Sudan`s unity less attractive to South Sudan.3 4.1 The lack of a reconciliation process was one of the factors that made Sudan`s unity less attractive to South Sudan. South Sudan.3 4.1 The SPLM consists of appointing a limited number of representatives who have access to all existing oil contracts. Representatives have the right to appoint technical experts.
All those who have access to the contracts sign confidentiality agreements. All states have adopted their constitutions. The northern and southern states have established a division of power between the executive and legislative branches. This confirms the implementation of the 2005 PCA provision on decentralisation/federalism. 22.1.10. Collect data and information on criminal cases that undermine the implementation of the peace agreement in the region. On 14 May, clashes between spLM and SAF took place in the town of Abyei, which lasted two days. The fighting killed about 90 people and destroyed much of the city.3 After the clashes, about 25,000 people fled the city.4 Both sides reportedly agreed on Abyei`s roadmap, which called for an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of other armed groups from Abyei.5 The SPLM is believed to be responsible for the attack in Abyei. SAF accused the SPLM of displacing 3,000 fully armed soldiers from the east and stationing them in the Akyec and Majok area around Abyei. The presence of SPLM forces prompted the 31st Infantry Brigade to remain in the area.6 After clashes, an immediate meeting of the Political Committee for the Armistice was held. Nevertheless, the security situation remained fragile, leading the United Nations to announce that it would halt repatriation work in the Abyei area.7 With respect to its share of oil revenues, the national government transferred approximately $669.92 million to The GoSS in the first quarter of 2010. Sudan`s total oil revenues in 2010 amounted to $4,423 million, of which the Government of South Sudan`s share was $1,802 million.
The government of South Sudan received $1,553 million from the national government in 2010.1 The GDR process in Sudan was recognized as very difficult because the agreement did not explicitly contain detailed information on the number of fighters to be demobilized, disarmed and integrated into society. However, the agreement provided for a phased approach by establishing an Interim Programme of the GDR (IDDRP) before a multi-year PROGRAMME of the GDR was fully completed.1 The Government of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SUDANESE ARMED FORCES), the SPLA, non-allied COAs, and children and women associated with combat troops were eligible for the GDR process. The APC established the GDR National Coordinating Council and two sub-national commissions, the North Sudan DDR Commission (NDDRC) and the South Sudan DDR Commission (SDDRC), which were tasked with designing, implementing and managing the GDR process at the subnational levels of the North and South, respectively. It was agreed that these institutional structures would be established within 30 days of the signing of the PCA. The PCA also provides gathering places for the SFA and SPLA fighters for the GDR process. Until the 19th. In December 2006, the fifteen northern states adopted a constitution. The southern states had not yet adopted a constitution.1 In November 2006, the Chief Justice of South Sudan announced the completion of the appointment of all judges and judges in the 10 southern states.2 In addition to monitoring and reviewing the deployment of troops and the deployment of UMI, UNMIS continued its monitoring and protection of civilians throughout Sudan, and its activities for monitoring and promoting human rights. However, this does not mean that UNMIS has successfully fulfilled its mandate to review and monitor the ceasefire agreement. It was reported that members of other armed groups who had joined the peace process had been admitted to the civil service.1 The Ministry of Energy had also reported that it had submitted to the NCSC a list of vacancies to be filled by citizens of South Sudan.2 By the end of 2009, it had been reported that the Presidency had approved 1,150 South Sudanese candidates for appointment to the civil service. National.
In addition, South Kordofan State formed a special committee in November 2009 to facilitate the integration of 1,708 SPLM officials into the political and administrative structure of the state.3 Given that the appointment of 700 Southerners in 2008 was expected to meet the 10 per cent of civil service posts, it can be said that the provisions of the agreement on civil service reform have been implemented. .